Why Calling Tejas Mk2 Obsolete by 2035 Sets the Wrong Benchmark
The claim that Tejas Mk2 will be obsolete by the mid-2030s rests on more than its 4.5-generation label. China’s fifth-generation fleet, Pakistan’s planned J-35, India’s AMCA ambitions, indigenous engine efforts, delays, imports, and the question of sovereign control all form a much more complex picture.
There is a growing narrative in Indian defence discourse that Tejas Mk2 could already be obsolete by the time it enters service in the mid-2030s. The argument is based largely on China's operational J-20 and J35, And its pursuit of 6th-generation fighters and Pakistan's move towards a Chinese fifth-generation platform, leading to the conclusion that inducting another 4.5-generation fighter by then would make little operational sense. But this conclusion overlooks how modern fighter fleets evolve, what Tejas Mk2 actually represents, and the strategic value of retaining sovereign control over a combat-aircraft programme.
5th Gen Jets Does Not Make 4.5 Gen Jets Obsolete
The presence of fifth-generation aircraft does not suddenly make every 4.5-generation fighter irrelevant. Around the world, countries continue to invest in and upgrade aircraft such as Rafale, Eurofighter and Gripen even as 5th-gen platforms enter service. These aircraft are expected to remain relevant for decades because air forces require a combination of capabilities, numbers and cost-effective combat mass, not just a small fleet of stealth aircraft.
The same logic applies to India. AMCA is intended to provide the fifth-generation capability, but that does not eliminate the requirement for a modern fighter below that tier. Tejas Mk2 can perform missions where stealth is not the only determining factor, including air defence, counter-air, strike, maritime operations and weapons carriage. The operational question is therefore not whether Mk2 is fifth-generation, but whether it possesses the sensors, EW, weapons, networking and situational awareness required to remain effective against the threats it will face.
Tejas Mk2 Is Not a Clean-Sheet Fighter
A major flaw in the “Mk2 will be immature by the 2030s” argument is treating it as if India will be starting development from zero. Tejas Mk2 is a substantially redesigned aircraft, but it is also the product of decades of LCA development. The programme has already created expertise in composite structures, flight-control laws, avionics, mission computers, software, systems integration, weapons integration and flight testing.
Tejas Mk1 has provided operational experience, while Mk1A is bringing more advanced AESA radar, electronic warfare, avionics and weapons integration into the ecosystem. Mk2 builds on this accumulated knowledge rather than beginning with an empty sheet of paper.
That distinction matters when comparing it with foreign 4.5-generation fighters. Rafale, Gripen, J-10 and J-16 may have entered service earlier, but their current capabilities are also the result of continuous development and upgrades. Tejas Mk2 will similarly enter as a later, more advanced configuration of an existing fighter family, not as the same aircraft that first flew decades earlier.
Look at the Configuration, Not the Calendar
The argument that “foreign 4.5-generation fighters already exist while Mk2 does not” also creates a false comparison. The aircraft India will receive in the 2030s should be compared with the technology available in those aircraft at that time, not with their original configurations.
If Mk2 enters service with an advanced AESA radar, modern electronic warfare suite, improved sensor fusion, network-centric capabilities, contemporary BVR weapons and greater situational awareness, its relevance cannot be dismissed simply because Rafale or Gripen entered service earlier.
Fighter capability is not determined by the year the prototype first flew. It is determined by what the combat system can detect, decide, engage, communicate and survive against.
Sovereignty Changes the Equation
This is where the comparison between Tejas Mk2 and Rafale needs greater context. India will operate Rafale for decades, and the aircraft is undoubtedly a highly capable platform. But comparing Mk2's future relevance simply against the Rafale already in Indian service misses a fundamental difference: Rafale remains a foreign-origin platform, while Mk2 gives India substantially greater control over its architecture, integration and future evolution. The fact that the IAF has demonstrated strong confidence in Rafale's operational capability should not automatically be interpreted as a lack of confidence in Tejas. These are different platforms serving different roles within India's force structure.
With Tejas Mk2, India can integrate indigenous weapons, modify mission software, develop its own EW capabilities and optimise the aircraft for integration with IACCS, AEW&C, ground-based sensors, UAVs and other elements of the Indian combat network. This becomes particularly important as India's indigenous ecosystem expands. Operational confidence in Rafale today does not negate the strategic value of having greater control over an indigenous platform tomorrow.
A foreign fighter can be exceptionally capable, but India cannot assume the same freedom to modify its architecture, integrate every indigenous system or rapidly alter its capabilities without OEM or third-country dependence. In a long-term conflict, the ability to control upgrades, weapons integration, software, sustainment and future modifications becomes a strategic advantage.
Autonomy Matters Most During War
The argument for indigenous aircraft becomes even stronger when viewed through the lens of a prolonged conflict. Fighter capability is not simply about what is delivered on day one: it is about whether the aircraft can be sustained, repaired, rearmed, modified and upgraded when supply chains are under pressure. A foreign fleet can become dependent on external sources for engines, spares, weapons, software support and critical upgrades, with political restrictions, sanctions or disrupted logistics potentially affecting availability during a conflict.
India is also gradually addressing one of the most important remaining gaps in this equation: the aero-engine. Efforts ranging from reviving the Kaveri programme and GTRE's work to partnerships with Safran, and the recently announced Reliance-Rolls-Royce collaboration, indicate a broader push towards developing sovereign engine capability. If these efforts mature through the 2030s, they could directly strengthen the sovereignty of Tejas, Tejas Mk2 and AMCA by giving India greater control over one of the most critical and strategically sensitive components of a fighter.
This is where the long-term advantage of an indigenous platform becomes particularly significant. An Indian fighter supported increasingly by indigenous engines, weapons, avionics, EW systems and software gives India substantially greater control over its production, sustainment and upgrade cycle than an imported fighter can realistically offer.
The Entire System Is the Real Challenge
The delays surrounding Tejas Mk1A and other indigenous programmes are real, but they cannot simply be placed at the door of the aircraft or manufacturer. The problem is systemic, involving the development agency, manufacturer, government decision-making, procurement bureaucracy, funding, supply chains and the end user.
The F404 episode illustrates this clearly. GE had delivered the contracted F404-IN20 engines for the original Mk1 requirement by 2016, but there was no immediate follow-on order. With no clear pipeline, GE subsequently shut down the production line, mothballed tooling, released suppliers and shifted capacity towards other active engine programmes. When the Mk1A requirement eventually resulted in an order for 99 additional F404-IN20 engines in 2021, the industrial ecosystem had to be restarted, adding further time to the supply chain.
The same problem extends to programme funding and decision-making. Tejas Mk2 development funding only began coming through in 2024, despite the programme having been under discussion for years. AMCA still has key decisions pending, including the selection of the prototype-development company and the industrial structure involving potential consortia such as TASL, L&T and Bharat Forge. Changing requirements from the end user have also contributed to delays across indigenous programmes. Late funding, delayed orders, changing requirements, slow procurement decisions and uncertainty over industrial participation can collectively add years to a programme. Indigenous programmes move at the speed of the entire system supporting them.
Delays Are Not an Argument for Endless Imports
This is where the debate often takes an illogical turn. Indigenous programmes face delays, therefore India should buy another foreign platform. That platform fills the immediate gap, but the underlying industrial problem remains. A few years later, another capability gap emerges, another foreign purchase is proposed, and the indigenous programme loses further urgency, resources and industrial momentum.
India certainly needs imports where an immediate operational requirement cannot wait. But imports should be a bridge, not the permanent solution to every indigenous delay.
The answer to a delayed programme should first be to identify what is causing the delay and fix it. If funding is late, release the funding. If production capacity is inadequate, build it. If a supplier is weak, develop alternatives. If requirements keep changing, freeze them. If integration is the problem, provide the resources required to complete integration.
Repeatedly replacing indigenous programmes with imports only treats the symptom.
Tejas Has Already Changed India's Defence Industry
The argument that the LCA programme has taken decades without producing enough aircraft is valid when discussing the IAF's immediate squadron strength. But using aircraft numbers alone to judge the programme's contribution misses what has been built around it.
The LCA programme created demand for capabilities that previously had little or no indigenous industrial depth - advanced composites, avionics, flight-control systems, mission computers, software, electronic warfare, precision manufacturing and specialised aerospace components. Private companies have also entered and expanded within this ecosystem.
That industrial base does not disappear when Tejas Mk1 or Mk2 is replaced by a future design. It becomes the foundation for AMCA and subsequent combat-aircraft programmes. Without this ecosystem, every future fighter would once again begin with the same technological and industrial gaps.
Conclusion
The argument that Tejas Mk2 will be obsolete by the mid-2030s rests too heavily on the calendar and the generation label. A 4.5-generation fighter entering service in the 2030s is not automatically obsolete simply because fifth-generation aircraft already exist. Its relevance will depend on its actual configuration, sensors, EW, weapons, networking, upgrade potential, production scale and integration into India's wider combat architecture.
More importantly, Tejas Mk2 is not an isolated procurement programme. It is part of India's attempt to build a sovereign combat-aircraft ecosystem that can progressively expand from Tejas Mk1 and Mk1A to Mk2, AMCA and future platforms. The indigenous engine efforts, growing private-sector participation and accumulated experience in avionics, composites, software, EW and systems integration all contribute to that trajectory.
India undoubtedly needs to address its immediate fighter shortfall, and foreign acquisitions can have a role where operational requirements cannot wait. But using every delay in an indigenous programme as an argument for another import risks creating a cycle in which delays lead to imports, imports reduce urgency for indigenous programmes, and the resulting weakness is then used to justify further imports.
The real question is therefore not whether Tejas Mk2 will be the most advanced fighter in the 2030s. It will not. The question is whether it can be a modern, capable and upgradeable fighter that strengthens India's combat fleet while preserving the technological and industrial base required to build the next one.