Pakistan's Evolving Defence Partnerships: Why India Should Watch, Not Worry
Pakistan's growing reliance on Chinese and Turkish defence technology is reshaping South Asia's security landscape. This article examines Islamabad's shift away from Western suppliers, the real-world performance of Chinese and Turkish military systems, and why India should view these developments as a military planning challenge.
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Pakistan’s defence relationship with China has evolved well beyond conventional arms purchases. Türkiye has emerged as another important partner, particularly in unmanned systems, naval platforms and defence-industrial cooperation. For India, the significance is not simply that Pakistan is receiving new weapons. It is that Islamabad is gaining access to technologies intended to make its forces more networked and diversified, even as its experience with Western suppliers has grown increasingly frustrating.
The practical record of these systems, most recently visible during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, suggests that access alone does not automatically translate into decisive capability. For India, this remains a planning consideration rather than a source of strategic alarm.
Growing Friction with Western Partners
Pakistan’s experience with Western suppliers has been marked by lengthy processes, delays and sustainment difficulties. The F-16 upgrade package illustrates the point. Islamabad first sought the modernisation in 2021, but the request stalled amid diplomatic tensions. Only in late 2025 did the United States notify Congress of a $686 million package covering Link-16 systems, avionics updates, cryptographic equipment and logistical support aimed at extending the fleet’s service life toward 2040. The sudden clearance under the Trump administration reflected a broader recalibration of American regional priorities, particularly regarding Iran and the wider Middle East, rather than a fundamental change in the long-standing pattern of delayed and conditional engagement with Pakistan.
Similar challenges have affected other programmes. The Sea Sultan long-range maritime patrol aircraft project, involving conversion of Embraer Lineage 1000 jets with Italian firm Leonardo’s participation, has progressed more slowly than initially anticipated. Early adjustments in contractor roles and the extended timeline for the first modified aircraft (expected in 2026 from a 2021 contract) have added to the sense of uncertainty. Meanwhile, the ageing Mirage III and Mirage 5 fleet faces mounting difficulties. Airframe fatigue, corrosion and dwindling availability of critical spares have driven progressive squadron retirements and rising maintenance costs, forcing the Pakistan Air Force to stretch limited resources simply to keep remaining aircraft flying.
These experiences have reinforced a strategic shift. In the present and near future, Pakistan appears to be placing the bulk of its military modernisation bets on China, with a secondary role for Türkiye, while reducing dependence on other suppliers to the bare minimum required for legacy platforms.
Reliability Questions Around the JF-17
The JF-17 Thunder, co-developed with China and now the numerical backbone of the Pakistan Air Force. Yet operational reliability remains a practical constraint. Availability rates for earlier blocks are commonly assessed in the 50–55 percent range, with high maintenance demands linked to engines and other subsystems keeping a substantial portion of the fleet in servicing or overhaul at any given time. Newer Block III aircraft benefit from improved sensors and weapons, but the overall force still faces the challenge of generating sufficient ready aircraft under sustained operational pressure.
Looking further ahead, discussions around the possible induction of China’s J-35 fifth-generation fighter have generated interest in Pakistani defence circles. However, realistic timelines suggest that any meaningful numbers are unlikely before the 2030s, leaving the force reliant on its current mix of platforms for the better part of the next decade.
Turkish Drones in Contested Airspace
Türkiye’s contribution has been most visible in unmanned systems. Turkish-origin drones demonstrated striking effectiveness in the 2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, where the airspace was relatively permissive and opposing air defences were limited. In more contested environments, however, the picture has been different. In the Russia–Ukraine war, once layered air defences and electronic warfare were fully deployed, losses rose sharply and the platforms’ impact declined. A similar pattern appeared during the May 2025 India–Pakistan exchanges. Turkish-origin drones and loitering munitions employed by Pakistan were largely intercepted or destroyed by India’s integrated, multi-layered air-defence network. The systems that had performed well against weaker or less prepared defences struggled against a mature, networked defensive architecture.
China as the Primary Pillar
China remains deeply embedded across Pakistan’s combat aircraft, missiles, air defence, naval systems and unmanned platforms. The JF-17 programme and the induction of the J-10C have given Pakistan experience in operating and supporting Chinese-origin platforms. During Operation Sindoor, however, Chinese-origin air-defence systems—including HQ-9 batteries—faced significant challenges. Indian precision strikes, supported by electronic warfare, successfully penetrated or neutralised multiple batteries and associated radars. The inability of these systems to consistently detect, track or intercept incoming threats highlighted real-world limitations under electronic attack and high-tempo operations.
The combination of Chinese aerospace and missile technology with Turkish expertise in drones and electronics offers Pakistan a more diverse set of options. Yet the operational record indicates that diversity of origin has not overcome fundamental asymmetries in scale, integration, sustainment and resilience.
The Battlefield Is Becoming More Networked
The clearest lesson for Indian planners is that future military competition will be decided less by individual platforms than by the ability to connect sensors, shooters and decision-makers under contested conditions. A fighter, missile or air-defence battery becomes far more effective when linked to airborne early-warning platforms, ground radars, electronic-warfare assets, satellites and unmanned systems. Conversely, even sophisticated imported systems lose effectiveness if the supporting network is incomplete or disrupted.
India’s response should therefore prioritise the integration of existing and future capabilities into a coherent operational architecture rather than simply matching platforms one-for-one.
India Retains Major Advantages
India approaches this competition from a markedly stronger technological and industrial position. A larger economy, an expanding private defence sector, and a broad technology base that includes both domestic organisations and partnerships with multiple advanced suppliers provide strategic flexibility. Parallel indigenous programmes across fighters, air defence, missiles, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, space and network-centric warfare continue to mature.
Operation Sindoor demonstrated elements of this advantage in practice. Indian forces conducted precise strikes while largely operating from within or near Indian airspace. Layered air defences successfully defeated incoming drone and missile threats. Electronic-warfare measures degraded opposing sensors. The result was that Pakistani systems of Chinese and Turkish origin were unable to prevent Indian objectives from being met.
Focus on Critical Gaps and Integration
Pakistan’s growing reliance on Chinese and Turkish technology, driven in part by frustrations with Western processes and sustainment challenges, usefully highlights areas where India’s own self-reliance remains important. Advanced fighter propulsion, electronic warfare, secure communications, advanced sensors, autonomous systems and military-grade semiconductors continue to demand sustained investment. These enabling technologies determine whether platforms retain effectiveness in heavily contested environments.
India does not need to replicate every system entering Pakistani service. The objective is to field forces capable of detecting, tracking, disrupting and defeating those systems while preserving the ability to operate under electronic and information-warfare pressure. Progress in network-centric warfare, joint operations and indigenous technology will matter more than numerical matching of individual platforms.
Pakistan’s expanding defence relationships provide a useful benchmark. They should reinforce India’s ongoing transformation rather than provoke reactive procurement. The strategic advantage India requires is not simply more weapons, but a more integrated, resilient and technologically independent military ecosystem. Pakistan may continue to place most of its modernisation effort with China and a secondary share with Türkiye; India’s longer-term edge will rest on its capacity to develop, integrate and continuously upgrade its own.